

***The Army  
Training and Leader Development  
Panel  
ATLDP Phase III - Warrant Officer  
Study***

***Final Report***



***18 July 2002***





REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER AND FORT LEAVENWORTH  
415 SHERMAN AVENUE, UNIT 1  
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-2300

ATZL-CG

17 July 2002


MEMORANDUM FOR

Chief of Staff, Army, 200 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-0200  
Commanding General, US Army TRADOC, 7 Fenwick Rd, Ft Monroe, VA 23651-1047

SUBJECT: Army Training and Leader Development Panel Report (Warrant Officers)

1. In accordance with the Chief of Staff, Army charter for the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP), and the TRADOC Commanding General's appending letter of instruction, the ATLDP Report (Warrant Officers) is forwarded as directed.
2. The purpose of the Panel was to study and research the leader development issues and tasks set forth in the CSA Charter, dtd 1 Jun 00, SAB, and TRADOC CG's LOI, dtd 6 Jun 00, SAB. The Panel effort commenced in September 2001, while the final Executive Panel was completed in December 2001. Enclosed is the report, which details the Panel's conclusions and recommendations for consideration and implementation.
3. The study resulted in 63 recommendations, extending across four crucial imperatives the Executive Panel felt the Army must address. These are:
  - a. Army Culture. Fully integrate warrant officers into the officer corps. Clarify and publish the role of the warrant officers in the total Army.
  - b. Training and Education. The current Warrant Officer Education System (WOES) fails to meet the needs of the Army and warrant officers and requires thorough revision.
  - c. Manning. The Army must develop and implement warrant officer recruiting, accession, and retention plans and programs to meet total Army requirements.
  - d. Professional Development. Warrant officer training and skills must be related to grade and position rather than linked to promotion. Ensure the revised WOES provides the right training at the right time for all warrant officers. Develop and put into practice performance based counseling tools to support effective developmental counseling.
4. On behalf of myself, LTG (Ret) Mike Steele and CW5(Ret) Don Howerton please accept our appreciation for the privilege of participating in and leading this effort.

Encl

  
JAMES C. RILEY  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Commanding



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415 SHERMAN AVENUE, UNIT 1  
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REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

ATZL-SWC-LD

17 July 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR

Chief of Staff, Army 200 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-0200  
Commanding General, US Army TRADOC, 7 Fenwick Rd, Ft Monroe, VA 23651-1047

SUBJECT: Army Training and Leader Development Panel, Phase III (WO Study) Report

1. In accordance with the Chief of Staff, Army charter for the Army Training and Leader Development Panel, the Phase III (Warrant Officers) Report is forwarded as directed.
2. The purpose of the Panel was to examine and make recommendations on the training and leader development tasks presented in the CSA Charter, dtd 1 Jun 00, SAB. The Panel effort commenced 17 September 2001 with the arrival, from around the world, of officers, warrant officers and NCOs who made up the study groups. The last executive Panel session was completed on 2 April 2002. Enclosed is the report that details the conclusions and recommendations for Army consideration and implementation. The report is about the Army's technician leaders, our tactically-expert trainers and advisors, and their commitment to the Army. It is also about the practices and policies that dilute their efforts and detract from their remarkable, selfless, and honorable service to the Nation.
3. There are 63 recommendations grouped into four major categories. The executive Panel felt that these recommendation sets were of such importance they should be considered imperatives that the Army must address. They are:
  - a. **Army Culture.** Fully integrate warrant officers into the officer corps. Clarify and publish the role of the warrant officer, by pay grade, in the total Army. Manage, educate, and assign warrant officers to the specific needs and requirements of their branch.
  - b. **Training and Education.** The current Warrant Officer Education System (WOES) fails to meet the needs of the Army and warrant officers. The quality and quantity of technical education and training must improve dramatically. Further, the WOES should become a specialized subset of the Officer Education System (OES), rather than a stand-alone operation.
  - c. **Manning.** The Army must develop and implement warrant officer recruiting, accession, and retention plans and programs to meet total Army requirements. At the heart of this is the involvement of commanders in the process. Additionally, the accession, recruiting, and retention of warrant officers must become a unified effort for the total Army, rather than disparate, under-funded operations in the Active Component, the U.S. Army Reserves, and the Army National Guard.


ATZL-SWC-LD

SUBJECT: Army Training and Leader Development Panel, Phase III (WO Study) Report

the involvement of commanders in the process, allowing commanders to set recruitment goals and to receive credit for each warrant officer accessed. Additionally, the manning process for the warrant officer force must become a unified effort for the total Army, rather than disparate, under-funded operations in the Active Component, the U.S. Army Reserves, and the Army National Guard. Further, the pay and compensation for warrant officers must be both attractive to qualified NCO's, and more competitive with the civilian job market.

- **Professional Development.** Link warrant officer training and skills by grade and position rather than promotion. Ensure the revised WOES provides the right branch-specific training at the right time for all warrant officers. Additionally, performance based counseling tools must be developed and put into practice to support credible and effective developmental counseling.

4. On behalf of myself, LTG (Ret) Mike Steele, CW5 (Ret) Don Howerton, the Panel's Senior Mentors, LTG Riley, the ATLDP Study Director, and all the great soldiers involved in the study, please accept our appreciation for the privilege of facilitating this effort. We were impressed and inspired by the commitment and dedication of the Army's leadership and the extraordinary effort of all involved in this effort. I am truly excited about the road ahead.



JOHN A. SPARKMAN

CW5, United States Army

Army Training and Leader Development Panel  
Phase III (WO Study) Director

# **ATLDP PHASE III – Warrant Officer Study**

## **Final Report**

### **PURPOSE**

1. This is the Army Training and Leader Development Panel's (ATLDP) Phase III (Warrant Officer Study) report of its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for Army Staff policy review and resourcing determinations. This report applies primarily to warrant officers. Subsequent panel efforts will address Department of the Army Civilians (Phase IV) and a unified report (Phase V).

### **STRATEGIC CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION – THE BOTTOM LINE**

2. The Army has relied upon warrant officers as its technically expert officer cohort for many years. The Objective Force, with its projected reliance upon modern systems and technology, will likely bring an expanded role for warrant officers. That said, the Army must make fundamental changes in the warrant officer (WO) cohort to support full spectrum operations. At the heart of this change is a complete integration of WOs into the larger officer corps – a process begun in the late 1980s and never completed. Warrant officers are recruited, accessed, paid, managed, educated, and retained separately from commissioned officers. The Army needs to clarify the roles of WOs, then make changes to WO professional development, training and education, and manning. These changes must be relevant to the roles of WOs and must be connected to each other by WOs' need for lifelong learning, structure, and standards and assessment. The Army must adopt these recommendations as a whole, not individually. Only by fully integrating WOs into the larger officer corps can the Army expect to receive the synergistic benefits of this panel's recommendations.

### **HISTORY OF WARRANT OFFICERS IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY**

3. The Army began its WO program in 1918, when it established the Army Mine-Planter Service in the Coast Artillery Corps and directed that WOs serve as masters, mates, chief engineers, and assistant engineers on vessels. The Warrant Officer Act of 1920 expanded the program. It authorized WO appointments to clerical, administrative, and band-leading duties. This expansion resulted from "A desire to reward enlisted men of long service and also to reward former commissioned officers of World War I who lacked either the educational or other eligibility requirements necessary for continuance in the commissioned status."

4. During World War II, the Army discovered the great utility and flexibility of its WO corps and expanded it to more than 57,000 soldiers in 40 occupational areas. Afterward, the Army conducted several studies to determine the purpose and form of its WO program. These studies affirmed the Army's need for WOs and proposed appointing WOs based on Army needs rather than as a reward for long and faithful service. In 1960, the Army published DA Circular 611-7 which formalized the definition of a WO as "A highly skilled technician who is provided to fill those positions above the enlisted level which are too specialized in scope to permit the effective development and continued utilization of broadly-trained, branch-qualified commissioned officers."

5. In 1985, the Army published a clear, concise warrant officer definition in [DA Pamphlet 600-11](#), *Warrant Officer Professional Development*:

An officer appointed by warrant by the Secretary of the Army, based upon a sound level of technical and tactical competence. The warrant officer is the highly specialized expert and trainer who, by gaining progressive levels of expertise and leadership, operates, maintains, administers, and manages the Army's equipment, support activities, or technical systems for an entire career.

6. In 1985, a DA study determined that WOs' technical expertise alone was not enough to meet the requirements of the Army's current and future doctrine. This finding led the Army to begin requiring WOs to be

proficient in basic tactical and leadership skills. In 1987, the 99th Congress changed [Title 10 USC, Armed Forces](#), to provide for the commissioning of WOs. The primary purpose of the legislation was to standardize the procedures used by the military services to appoint WOs. A key provision was that all chief warrant officers received commissions, while WO1s continued to be appointed, not commissioned. Congress specified three primary goals of this decision to commission WOs:

- Give WOs authority to administer oaths of reenlistment.
- Designate selected WOs as commanding officers, with greater authority to impose nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, UCMJ.
- Characterize service of commissioned WO as “commissioned service.”

7. The 1992, Warrant Officer Leader Development Action Plan (WOLDAP) improved WO training, personnel management, and leader development programs by establishing–

- An accession goal of eight years or less time-in-service for WO candidates.
- A comprehensive WO education system consisting of–
  - Preappointment level – [Warrant Officer Candidate School](#).
  - Entry level – [Warrant Officer Basic Course](#) (WO1).
  - Advanced level – [Warrant Officer Advanced Course](#) (CW3).
  - Senior level – [Warrant Officer Staff Course](#) (CW4).
  - Master level – [Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course](#) (CW5).
  - Conditional appointment to WO1 upon successful completion of Warrant Officer Candidate School.
  - Civilian education goals of an associate’s degree before promotion to CW3 and a bachelor’s degree before promotion to CW4.
  - The [Warrant Officer Career Center](#). (WOCC)

## **THE ARMY WARRANT OFFICER TODAY**

8. WOs compose about two percent of the Army and are distributed as follows:

- Active Army – 54%.
- ARNG – 33%
- USAR – 13%

9. WOs are well educated. Virtually all active component WOs and 56 percent of reserve component WOs have two or more years of college.

10. In 1999, the Army updated [FM 6-22 \(22-100\), Army Leadership](#), which describes the roles of officers, WOs, noncommissioned officers and Department of the Army Civilians. The roles assigned to warrant officers are as follows:

- Command special-purpose units and task-organized operational elements.
- Execute policy and manage the Army’s systems.
- Deal primarily with units and unit operations.
- Operate, maintain, administer, and manage Army equipment, support activities, and technical systems.
- Focus on collective, leader, and individual training.
- Concentrate on unit effectiveness and readiness.
- Provide quality advice, counsel, and solutions to support the command.

11. The [Warrant Officer Division](#), first established in 1974 at US Army [Personnel Command](#) (PERSCOM), centrally manages WO assignments and professional development. Table ES-1 shows the number of WOs assigned to each branch, by component. Nearly half of all Army WOs are in aviation branch, 51 percent in

technical specialties, and two percent in the Special Forces. Warrant officers serve in every branch except infantry and armor. More than half of all warrant officers serve in combat arms.


**Table 1. Warrant Officer – Branch Distribution**

<b>BRANCH</b>	<b>Active Army</b>	<b>USAR</b>	<b>ARNG</b>	<b>TOTALS</b>
<b>13 (FA)</b>	206	0	126	332 (<2%)
<b>14 (AD)</b>	214	0	16	230 (1%)
<b>15 (AV)</b>	5467	353	3,801	9,621 (45%)
<b>18 (SF)</b>	396	1	53	450 (2%)
<b>21 (EN)</b>	79	53	64	196 (<1%)
<b>25 (SC)</b>	430	103	258	791 (<4%)
<b>31 (MP)</b>	367	126	20	513 (<3%)
<b>35 (MI)</b>	986	260	124	1,370 (6%)
<b>42 (AG)</b>	251	273	763	1,287(6%)
<b>55 (JA)</b>	82	47	35	164 (<1%)
<b>60 (MC)*</b>	0	1	1	3 (<1%)
<b>64 (VC)</b>	60	11	0	71 (<1%)
<b>67 (MS)</b>	60	54	1	115 (<1%)
<b>88 (TC)</b>	221	105	3	329 (<2%)
<b>91 (OD)</b>	1623	516	1291	3,430 (16%)
<b>92 (QM)</b>	902	33	808	2,143 (10%)
<b>Other</b>	0	139	130	269 (1%)
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>11,344 (53%)</b>	<b>2,475 (12%)</b>	<b>7,495 (35%)</b>	<b>21,314 (100%)</b>

\*Obsolescing Physician’s Assistant specialty

## WHAT THE FIELD TOLD THE CHIEF OF STAFF

12. These are the top five responses from the field and the number of WOs making the response when asked, “What would you tell the CSA is the most important change he can make to WO training and leader development?” Respondents were not given a list to choose from, these are their own choices:



## STRATEGIC CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

13. The following diagram illustrates the relationships among the strategic conclusions and recommendations presented in this study. It shows that the issues are fully intertwined and unalterably linked to each other. Ultimately, it proposes a new model for the Army WO program. This model should be viewed as a whole rather than a series of unrelated parts. If taken as a whole, this model can deliver the synergy typically expected from a fully integrated system.



## Strategic View of the ATLDP Warrant Officer Report



14. Army Culture, represented by the full integration of WOs into the officer corps and WOs' role throughout the Army, lies at the center of this model. Three imperatives lie at the points: manning, professional development, and training and education. They are closely connected to Army Culture and to each other through structure, lifelong learning, and standards and assessment. Key issues define each imperative.

15. The remainder of this report offers conclusions, and recommendations for each subject identified below.

Army Culture	Manning	Professional Development	Training and Education
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Full Integration into the Officer Corps</li> <li>• Roles of the WO in the Army</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Recruiting</li> <li>• Accessions</li> <li>• Retention</li> <li>• Pay and Compensation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Operational Assignments</li> <li>• Mentoring</li> <li>• Counseling</li> <li>• Personnel Management</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Technical Specialty Training</li> <li>• Reach Back and Reach Forward Training</li> <li>• Warrant Officer Education System</li> </ul>
<b>Links:</b> Structure of the Warrant Officer Cohort, Life Long Learning, Standards and Assessments			

16. The report follows this format for each subject:

- What the field told us – data.
- Our conclusions from the data.
- Our recommendations.

### ARMY CULTURE

17. Under Army Culture, the Panel examined integrating WOs into the larger officer corps and the role of WOs throughout the Army.

### **What the Field Told Us**

- WOs believe themselves to be separate from the rest of the officer corps. This has a negative effect upon many aspects of WOs' service.
- WOs want the Army to clarify their role in the Objective Force.
- WOs want their supervisors to better understand their technical role, as it is critical to the proper utilization, evaluation, and development of WOs.

### **Full Integration of Warrant Officers into the Officer Corps**

18. Full integration addresses the extent to which the development and use of WOs should be combined with that of other commissioned officers.

### **Conclusion**

19. The Total Warrant Officer Study (TWOS) began the process of integrating warrant officers into the officer corps, but because of Army Cultural bias, that process is not complete. Warrant officers are recruited, accessed, paid, managed, educated, and retained separately from the rest of the officer corps. The Army requires a fully integrated officer corps ready to meet the challenges of contemporary operating environment and full spectrum operations. As it fully integrates WOs into the officer corps, the Army must preserve those elements of WO heritage, lineage, traditions, and honors that serve the Army's ultimate purpose.

### **Recommendations**

20. Fully integrate WOs into the Army officer corps. Direct the G1, as the Army's executive agent, to ensure consolidation of WO requirements and policies into Army regulations and DA pamphlets.

21. Review and update current Defense Officer Personnel Management Act and Warrant Officer Management Act in coordination with the other services. Combine them into a single Defense Officer Personnel Management Act.

22. Change AR 670-1 to direct WOs to wear the insignia and colors of their Branch.

23. Develop and implement the following common personnel management policies:

- In coordination with the other services, implement commissioning of WO1s upon successful completion of an officer candidate course and/or basic course.
- Assign responsibility for professional development and management, assignments, training, and education, of all officers to the branch proponents in the Officer Personnel Management Division (OPMD) of PERSCOM. Determine and allocate resources for branch proponents to accomplish this. Doing this will develop synergy in training, education, leader, and professional development. This integration must be, as a minimum, for assignments and branch-specific schooling. Evaluate the feasibility of maintaining a reduced WO branch to work common schooling, civilian education, Training With Industry and central management of CW5s (similar to the GOMO, colonels branch, and CSM branch).

24. Incorporate WO career and professional development requirements into DA Pam 600-3, [\*Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management\*](#). Include common officer, branch, rank, and position requirements. Requirements must include mandatory assignments and the qualitative experience WOs must gain in each assignment by grade, position, and specialty. Include definitions of the role, duties, responsibilities, and authority of the WO. Use the principle that WO acquire both tactical and technical competence appropriate to their grade, branch, and specialty through progressive training, education, and utilization. Affirm the WO role as the Army's foremost expert and trainer on technical systems and equipment. Link this work to the following recommendations:

- Transform WOES, beginning with a needs analysis, job analysis and critical individual task analysis, as specified in TRADOC Regulation 350-70, *Systems Approach to Training*.
- Update WO duties by grade and specialty in DA Pam 611-21, *Military Occupational Classification and Structure*, Chapter 8, Qualifications for and Duties of Specific Military Occupations.
- Update duty descriptions in DA Pam 611-21. Use them to develop and maintain individual tasks, conditions, standards, performance measures and doctrinal references associated with battle-focused duties.
- Consult the [United States Military Academy](#) work on officership. Integrate this approach to officership in future WO education.

25. Establish and resource a Chief Warrant Officer of the Branch (CWOB) position at proponent centers where they do not currently exist. Standardize and formalize CWOB duties as follows:

- Serve as principal advisor to the commanding general/branch chief on all matters pertaining to WOs.
- Act as the branch chief's conduit to WOs in the field.
- Serve as the primary advocate or liaison for branch WO training and leader development issues.
- Act as single point of contact for all WO issues at their respective branch.
- Assess, monitor, and solve problems related to training, professional development, morale, recruiting, retention and readiness.
- Write branch doctrine for WO accession, training, and career development issues.
- Perform proponent personnel management functions for the branch Chief IAW AR 600-3, The Army Personnel Proponent System.
- Coordinate WO strength issues, especially WO assignments and utilization, with PERSCOM and MACOM strength managers.

### **The WO Role in Throughout the Army**

26. The current definition of a warrant officer has served since 1985.

An officer appointed by warrant by the Secretary of the Army, based upon a sound level of technical and tactical competence. The warrant officer is the highly specialized expert and trainer who, by gaining progressive levels of expertise and leadership, operates, maintains, administers, and manages the Army's equipment, support activities, or technical systems for an entire career.

### **Conclusion**

27. Responses from the field suggest that WO roles and missions are not well understood throughout the Army and especially not by WO supervisors.

### **Recommendations**

28. Adopt the following general definition of the warrant officer:

**General Role of the WO in Full Spectrum Operations:** The WO of the Objective Force is a self aware and adaptive technical expert, leader, trainer, and advisor. Through progressive levels of expertise in assignments, training, and education, the WO administers, manages, maintains, operates, and integrates Army systems and equipment across the full range of Army operations. WOs are innovative integrators of emerging technologies, dynamic teachers, confident war-fighters, and developers of specialized teams of soldiers. They support a wide range of Army missions throughout their career.

29. Adopt the following specific definition of warrant officers by grade.

- **WO1.** An officer appointed by warrant with the requisite authority pursuant to assignment level and position given by the Secretary of the Army. WO1s are basic level, technically focused officers who perform the primary duties of technical leader, trainer, operator, manager, maintainer, and sustainer.

They also perform any other branch-related duties assigned to them. They provide direction, guidance, resources, assistance, and supervision necessary for subordinates to perform their duties. WO1s have specific responsibility for accomplishing the missions and tasks assigned to them and, if assigned as a commander, the collective or organizational responsibility for how well their command performs its mission. WO1s primarily support levels of operations from team through battalion, requiring interaction with all soldier cohorts and primary staff. They provide leader development, mentorship, and counsel to enlisted soldiers and NCOs.

- **CW2.** A commissioned officer with the requisite authority pursuant to assignment level and position as given by the President of the United States. CW2s are intermediate level technical and tactical experts who perform the primary duties of technical leader, trainer, operator, manager, maintainer, sustainer, and advisor. They also perform any other branch-related duties assigned to them. They provide direction, guidance, resources, assistance, and supervision necessary for subordinates to perform their duties. They have specific responsibility for accomplishing the missions and tasks assigned to them and, if assigned as a commander, the collective or organizational responsibility for how well their command performs its mission. CW2s primarily support levels of operations from team through battalion, requiring interaction with all soldier cohorts and primary staff. They provide leader development, mentorship, advice, and counsel to NCOs, other WOs and company-grade branch officers.
- **CW3.** A commissioned officer with the requisite authority pursuant to assignment level and position as given by the President of the United States. CW3s are advanced level technical and tactical experts who perform the primary duties of technical leader, trainer, operator, manager, maintainer, sustainer, integrator, and advisor. They also perform any other branch-related duties assigned to them. They provide direction, guidance, resources, assistance, and supervision necessary for subordinates to perform their duties. CW3s have specific responsibility for accomplishing the missions and tasks assigned to them and, if assigned as a commander, the collective or organizational responsibility for how well their command performs its mission. CW3s primarily support levels of operations from team through brigade, requiring interaction with all soldier cohorts and primary staff. They provide leader development, mentorship, advice, and counsel to NCOs, other WOs and branch officers. CW3s advise commanders on WO issues.
- **CW4.** A commissioned officer with the requisite authority pursuant to assignment level and position as given by the President of the United States. CW4s are senior level technical and tactical experts who perform the primary duties of technical leader, manager, maintainer, sustainer, integrator and advisor. They also perform any other branch-related duties assigned to them.. They provide direction, guidance, resources, assistance, and supervision necessary for subordinates to perform their duties. CW4s have specific responsibility for accomplishing the missions and tasks assigned to them and, if assigned as a commander, the collective or organizational responsibility for how well their command performs its mission. They primarily support battalion, brigade, division, corps, and echelons above corps operations. They must interact with NCOs, other officers, primary staff, and special staff. CW4s primarily provide leader development, mentorship, advice, and counsel to NCOs, other WOs and branch officers. They have special mentorship responsibilities for other WOs and provide essential advice to commanders on WO issues.
- **CW5.** A commissioned officer with the requisite authority pursuant to assignment level and position as given by the President of the United States. CW5s are master level technical and tactical experts who perform the primary duties of technical leader, manager, integrator, advisor, or any other particular duty prescribed by branch. They provide direction, guidance, resources, assistance, and supervision necessary for subordinates to perform their duties. CW5s have specific responsibility for accomplishing the missions and tasks assigned to them. CW5s primarily support brigade, division, corps, echelons above corps, and major command operations. They must interact with NCOs, other officers, primary staff and special staff. They provide leader development, mentorship, advice, and counsel to WOs and branch officers. CW5s have special WO leadership and representation

responsibilities within their respective commands. They provide essential advice to commanders on WO issues.

## **MANNING**

30. Under manning, the Panel examined the areas of recruiting, accession, retention, and pay and compensation.

### **RECRUITING, ACCESSION AND RETENTION**

#### **What the Field Told Us**

- WOs believe increasing pay and allowances to be important in improving recruitment and retention.
- WOs feel not enough qualified NCOs are being accessed as WOs.
- WOs perceive the following deterrents to NCOs becoming WOs:
  - Pay compression.
  - Promotion risk.
  - Unfavorable perceptions of WO jobs and positions.
- NCOs see the following deterrents:
  - Not meeting qualifications.
  - Application process too cumbersome and time consuming; leaders not conversant.
  - Discouragement by others.

#### **Conclusions**

31. The Army recruits and accesses its WOs through one of four selection methods: early, early career, mid-career, and late career. For most WO specialties, proponents require prospective candidates to be sergeants or above with four to six years experience in the feeder MOS and a [Basic NCO Course](#) (BNCOC) graduate. The Army's objective is to recruit WOs principally with the early career method; however, in practice, proponents prefer the mid- and late-career selection. More senior soldiers are more competent leaders and branch warfighting experts, and possess a higher level of technical expertise and leadership ability. Early career candidates possess fewer leadership, tactical, and technical skills than the mid- or late career selectees. Using the early career method requires the Army to invest in training and leader development of these WOs, both in institutions and through developmental operational experiences throughout their careers. The Army has not made this investment.

32. Recruiting WOs is not currently a command responsibility, but it should be. Units do not receive credit against their enlisted retention objectives when an NCO is recruited to become a WO, but they should. WO recruiting currently resides formally with the US Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) and informally with the proponents and WOs in the field. The Army has an intensive recruiting program for enlisted soldiers – USAREC, with recruiting stations manned by officers and NCOs throughout the United States; national television, radio, and print advertising; and initiatives such as the hometown recruiting program. Retaining enlisted soldiers is a command-interest item supported by a full range of reenlistment objectives, reenlistment counselors, incentives, bonuses, and assignments. Unfortunately, the Army has unintentionally created informal disincentives for recruiting WOs from the NCO ranks. Officers and NCOs are more familiar and more inclined to encourage quality NCOs to become second lieutenants in the “green to gold program” instead of WOs through the WO accession program.

33. With the exception of aviation branch, the Army WO program does not recruit civilians. Thus, the Army misses opportunities to recruit potentially capable civilians from occupations that require skills and experiences relevant to Army technical specialties. The technical specialties could use the early select model, as Army Aviation does, to recruit some of its WOs directly from civilian life. While this may not work for all WO

specialties, proponents, in coordination with USAREC and Army education, could reverse engineer Army education's [COOL \(Credentialing Opportunities On-Line\)](#) program, which explains how soldiers can meet civilian certification and license requirements related to their Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs). This program provides information proponents could use to recruit from civilian occupations.

34. Until recently, the active component has not had a problem in recruiting, accessing, and retaining WOs; however, possible problems may be developing, both in overall WO strength and in some WO specialties. Four WO specialties are not meeting or are struggling to meet accession goals, due to small accession pool populations: 311A (CID Agent), 215D (Terrain Analysis Technician), 351B (Counterintelligence Technician), and 351E (Human Intelligence Collection Technician). Four WO specialties have retention problems: 153D (UH-60 Aviator), 154C (CH-47D Aviator), 155E (C-12 Aviator), and 351B (Counterintelligence Technician). These specialties appear to have great demand in the civil sector. Over the last five years, active component applications for the WO program have declined from 3.2 per position to 1.8 per position (see Table 2). Data analysis, especially WO responses, identified the following factors as causing a decline in applications:

- WOs who recruit and the feeder NCOs whose direct leader skills transfer to WO positions do not see WO service as attractive an option as it once was. Pay, training, education, and the lack of integration into and acceptance by the Army officer corps are the primary disincentives cited.
- WOs perform additional duties, serve in staff assignments, and fill commissioned officer positions. This results in a perception among WOs and NCOs in feeder MOSs that WOs will not have the opportunity to become highly qualified experts in a specific field.
- WOs perceive a failure by the Army to invest in the training and education needed to develop the direct leader skills and actions they require to meet the Army's expectations. The Army policy of accessing WOs using the early career model, when candidates' skills are not well developed, reinforces this perception.
- WOs and feeder NCOs cite the lack of a formal recruiting program involving the chain of command. This results in disincentives for leaders and units in recruiting WOs, distracters to NCOs in feeder MOSs, and failure to adapt the application process to modern technology.
- Increased operational pace results in less time to recruit, apply, and endorse prospective WO candidates.
- A growing competitiveness and attractiveness of civilian jobs requiring skills developed in the technical branches and WO specialties.

**Table 2. Warrant Officer Applicant Ratio – Active Component**

Year	Positions	Applicants	Ratio	Year	Positions	Applicants	Ratio
<b>FY 96</b>	920	3,026	3.2	<b>FY 99</b>	838	1,964	2.34
<b>FY 97</b>	844	2,544	3.01	<b>FY 00</b>	928	1,854	1.99
<b>FY 98</b>	1,095	2,239	2.04	<b>FY 01</b>	1,102	1,930	1.75

37. The reserve component (RC) has significant problems recruiting and accessing WOs. The RC accessions system is different from the active component and provides an array of WOs from predictable and unpredictable sources. (These include WOs who exit the active component, WO transferees from one reserve component to the other, other services, and branch officers that become WOs). Existing shortages in units, projected significant mandatory retirements among the senior WO population over the next ten years, and normal attrition will leave the reserve components significantly short of their requirements. This will negatively affect the Army's ability to meet the nation's requirements. ARNG and USAR WO accessions have failed to replace losses for the past nine years (see Table 3).

**Table 3. Warrant Officer Losses and Gains – Reserve Component**

Component	Average Gain	Average Loss
ARNG	301	427
USAR	299	370

38. Current age demographics of RC WOs indicate increasing retirement rates over the next ten years as senior WOs reach their mandatory retirement date (see Table 4). There are enough NCOs currently in the reserve components to fill the vacant WO positions. Focusing only on active guard reserve (AGR) soldiers will not solve the problem of vacant WO positions in the reserve force structure.

**Table 4. Reserve Component – Warrant Officer Strength Profile by Age**

Component	20–30	31–40	41–50	51+	Total
ARNG	410 (5%)	2,464 (33%)	2,144 (28%)	2,532 (34%)	7,550
USAR	157 (3%)	1,624 (29%)	1,669 (29%)	2,216 (39%)	5,666*
* Includes all categories of soldiers (TPU, AGR, IRR, IMA).					

39. There is a difference of opinion between what feeder-MOS-NCOs and serving WOs believe makes WO service an attractive career choice. When asked which factors make WO service an attractive career choice, feeder-MOS-NCOs gave high ratings to compensation (particularly retirement pay) and the status and prestige of WOs. In contrast, serving WOs cited status and prestige as a deterrent to NCOs becoming WOs. Their suggestions for encouraging well-qualified NCOs to become WOs emphasized offering greater monetary incentives such as pay increases and skill-based bonuses.

40. The most common recruiting suggestion offered by feeder-MOS NCOs was to increase the involvement of WOs in recruiting and mentoring of eligible NCOs.

### Recommendations

41. Develop, resource, and implement a program that places responsibility on the chain of command for recruiting, accessing, and retaining WOs to meet the Army’s requirements. The Army G-1 should develop a strategy to provide resources to and link USAREC, PERSCOM, branch proponents, commanders, WOs, and installations in a comprehensive effort to recruit and access WOs. The Army must develop and implement recruiting and accessing using all accession methods. Priority should be early career, then early select, then mid-career, then late career.

42. Develop, implement, and resource a formal WO recruiting organization and program:

- Determine the mission, organization, manning, program, and resources required to develop, implement, and sustain a formal Armywide (AC, ARNG, and USAR) WO recruitment program.
- Define the mission and responsibilities of USAREC, branch proponents, and MACOMs with respect to WO recruitment and accession.
- Enable USAREC, in coordination with PERSCOM and the proponents, to establish WO recruiting goals by branch and specialty based on enlisted feeder MOS demographics. Include the requirement in MACOM reenlistment missions. As with the enlisted recruitment program, these objectives should be established at the beginning of the fiscal year, and updated quarterly.



43. Eliminate disincentives to WO recruitment and accession in units:

- Give reenlistment credit to commanders for recruiting and accessing WOs.
- Enable commanders to receive replacements when a soldier leaves the unit to attend a WO candidate course.
- Allow NCOs who received enlistment or reenlistment bonuses to retain them when accessed as WOs. Specifically, amend Title 37 United States Code, Section 308 to ensure that NCOs will not forfeit their reenlistment bonuses upon appointment or commissioning.
- Review the WOCS active duty service obligation to ensure it is consistent with commissioned officers who are accessed from OCS.
- Review the application process to determine how it can be made simpler. Then adapt it to current technology:
- Make USAREC's current WO recruiting web site interactive. Enable soldiers to discuss their particular requirements online with USAREC WO recruiters. Link the site to branch proponents and PERSCOM subject matter experts who can provide additional guidance and direction.
- Assess the 90-day requirement for letters of recommendations. Given increased deployments and operational pace, letters of recommendation done within the past 12 months should suffice
- Put copies of the Form Flow files on the WO recruiting web site vice having a link to the [Army Forms web site](#) and allow soldiers go to that site to look for and download those forms.
- Direct Army forms manager to make the ADOBE forms so that they can be filed electronically. Currently, a NCO has to print the application forms, put in a typewriter and type them. Making the forms "fill-able" on-line, enables the NCO to download the forms, fill them in on a computer using the [ADOBE Acrobat Reader](#), print and include in the application packet.
- Automate the application process. Enable personnel support battalions to electronically process packets, authenticate signatures, and e-mail them to USAREC. DA Form 61, DA Form 160, and the resume contain redundant information. Create one form with all pertinent data. Enable proponents to view applications and submit qualification letters via e-mail. Enable soldiers to authorize proponents to view data available through enlisted record briefs available online through [Army Knowledge Online](https://etransserv.erec.army.mil) at <https://etransserv.erec.army.mil>.

44. Develop, implement, and resource an informal WO recruiting organization and program at MACOM, installation, and unit level. Designate and resource a senior WO or the installation Warrant Officer Leader Development Council (WOLDC) to advise the command on WO recruitment and accession. Under the direction of this senior WO or WOLDC, establish a network of branch representative WOs to work together to identify prospective WO candidates, assist them with application questions and processes, and track recruiting goal attainment. This senior WO or WOLDC could assist USAREC's recruiting team visits to installations by resourcing a one-stop WO packet support office to provide DA photo capability, microfiche support, photocopying capability, flight physicals, and interview support to prospective WO candidates.

45. Direct the Accessions Command, PERSCOM, and TRADOC branch proponents to study the feasibility of linking existing ROTC programs to universities and vocational and technical schools whose programs could provide WO candidates with relevant civilian experiences, education, and training.

46. Use the Army's COOL web site to identify civilian occupations that meet proponent equivalent requirements.

47. Apply the early accession method to WO specialties other than aviation to recruit and access individuals from civilian occupations that require skills and experiences relevant to the WO specialty.

48. Direct PERSCOM, OCAR, and NGB to conduct a review of existing and projected RC WO shortages over the next ten years and use all available RC assets, while maintaining a single standard for the Army. Solutions should consider—



- Increasing commander involvement.
- Eliminating disincentives to WO recruitment and accession in units.
- Eliminating disincentives to NCOs deciding to become WOs.
- General counsel review of PL 90-486 (Technician Act of 1968) that addresses military technician dual status, or grade inversion.
- Expanding the state and regional officer candidate schools to the combined officer/warrant officer curriculum. (See the education recommendation regarding a single, combined officer candidate school.)
- Developing and implementing recruitment programs targeting the early career population (5–8 year NCO) opposed to late career (12–15 year NCO).
- Aggressively informing troop program unit (TPU) soldiers about the WO program.
- Providing bonuses for soldiers who become WOs in the ARNG and USAR.
- Develop an accessions system that draws more from predictable sources than unpredictable sources.

49. In WO specialties with accession shortfalls, conduct a review on the feasibility of expanding the feeder MOSs to include more MOSs in their accession pools. This review should also consider whether the Army can access individuals directly from civilian careers having skills related to the WO specialty. Invest in training and education through the Warrant Officer Candidate School and the Warrant Officer Basic Course to provide the individual the direct leader skills needed to serve as a WO1.

50. The reserve components should recruit TPU soldiers as aggressively as they do AGR soldiers. Focusing only on AGR soldiers will not solve the problem of vacant WOs positions in the RC force structure.

51. Develop and implement a flexible, multifaceted program to retain WOs in career fields that exhibit retention problems:

- Initiate a selective retention bonus program for specialties that do not meet retention requirements and negatively affect readiness.
- Review active duty service obligations for technical training and education, to ensure adequate utilization.
- Create more command-sponsored tours for specific WO specialties that are affected most by the recurring nature of some assignments (for example, Chinook and Apache pilots).
- Determine why WOs of selected specialties retire at higher rates at certain times in service. Prepare a recruitment strategy that compensates for these losses.

## **PAY AND COMPENSATION**

### **What the Field Told Us**

- WOs do not feel their compensation is commensurate with their skills and responsibilities.
- WOs cited pay and promotion risks as obstacles to NCOs considering becoming WOs.
- NCOs, however, cite pay as an attractive factor of a WO career.

### **Conclusions**

52. The small difference between the pay of NCOs, especially senior NCOs, and that of WO1s is a disincentive to NCOs considering appointment as WOs.

53. Many soldiers believe that WO1 pay does not sufficiently compensate NCOs for the increase in responsibilities and duties that comes with appointment as a WO.

54. The pay difference between enlisted soldiers and WOs has declined over the past 30 years. For sergeants, the pay increase is still a very significant 20 percent – only 3 percent less than it was in 1971 (see Table 5).

**Table 5. Early Career Select – Pay Differential (E5 w/5 Years Active Federal Service) Includes Base Pay, Standard BAH, and BAS**

Year	E-5	WO1	Difference-\$	Difference -%
2002	\$2,628	\$3,164	\$536	20%
1982	\$1,330	\$1,644	\$314	24%
1971	\$618	\$758	\$140	23%

55. However, for staff sergeants, the pay differential has decreased from 13 percent in 1971 to 9 percent today (see Table 6).

**Table 6. Early-Career Select – Pay Differential (E6 w/8 years Active Federal Service) Includes Base Pay, Standard BAH, and BAS**

Year	E-6	WO1	Difference-\$	Difference-%
2002	\$3,116	\$3,385	\$270	9%
1982	\$1,551	\$1,753	\$202	13%
1971	\$717	\$807	\$90	13%

56. For sergeants first class, the pay differential has decreased from 3 percent in 1971 to a negative 2 percent currently. This is a strong disincentive to senior NCOs who might wish to apply for the WO program (see Table 7).

**Table 7. Mid-Career Select – Pay Differential (SFC w/10 Years Active Federal Service) Includes Base Pay, Standard BAH, and BAS**

Year	E-7	WO1	Difference-\$	Difference - %
2002	\$3558	\$3500	\$-58	-2%
1982	\$1551	\$1808	\$48	3%
1971	\$717	\$831	\$24	3%

57. Some NCOs who received enlistment or reenlistment bonuses apply to become WOs. Currently, NCOs who are appointed WOs are required by law (Title 37 United States Code Section 308 paragraph (d)(1)) to pay back a portion of such a bonus based on the time remaining in their enlistment or reenlistment when they are appointed. This is a disincentive to WO recruiting.

58. In 1958, the Department of Defense adopted a policy (DOD Financial Management Regulation, Volume 7A, Chapter 1, paragraph 0103) that “made commissioned officers in pay grades O-1–O-3 with over four years of prior active service as an enlisted member entitled to special rate pay grade O1E–O-3E.” Today, the difference in base pay between second lieutenants with prior enlisted service and second lieutenants with no prior enlisted service is 21percent. However, there is no special pay rate for WOs with prior enlisted service.

## Recommendations

59. Amend the Army pay scale to give WOs with prior enlisted service the same percentage increase in base pay that officers with prior enlisted service receive. Currently, the difference is 21 percent and applies to O-1s, O-2s, and O-3s with at least four years of prior enlisted service. Apply this change to WO1s, CW2, and CW3s

with prior enlisted service. This change will help redress the downward trend in pay difference between WOs and NCOs.

60. Restore the previous pay difference that historically separated enlisted pay grades from WO pay grades.

## **PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT**

61. On the subject of professional development and personnel management, the Panel considered operational assignments, counseling, and the officer evaluation report.

### **WHAT THE FIELD TOLD US**

- WOs believe their assignments are made without sufficient regard to their professional development.
- WOs believe that their supervisors do not fully understand the roles and missions of WOs in the Army.
- WOs are not receiving proper performance counseling.

### **OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS**

#### **Conclusions**

62. Half of all WOs (48–57%) believe that duty assignments are not made with their career development in mind. PERSCOM may assign a WO to a specific position, but the MACOM, installation, or unit assignment officer may divert that WO to a different job. An unintended consequence of this policy is assignment of WOs to positions for which they have not received adequate institutional training and education. AR 623-105, *Officer Evaluation Reporting System*, requires that WOs be assigned principal duties for their grade or next lower grade and only in their primary or additional specialty. Exceptions require HQDA approval (IAW paragraph 1-7, AR 611-112, *Military Occupational Classification and Structure*, and must be explained in part IIIe, DA Form 67-9 (OER). The field's practice of assigning WOs one or two grades higher than their current grade places these WOs in a position of developing the skills for the position through on-the-job training. When WOs were asked in focus groups, "How can assignment policies for WOs be improved?," their number-one response was "by assigning WOs by grade and skill." WOs believe they are assigned outside of their grade too often.

63. The Director of Officer Personnel Management recently directed that all assignment divisions and branches within OPMD display their requisitions on their web sites. Some branches have been doing so for quite some time. The OPMD Director's intent is for officers in the field to see what requirements exist within the window they expect to move. WO Personnel Management Division posts specialty, grade, MACOM, reporting date, and remarks, but no job description, unit, qualifications (other than a specialty or ASI), or link to the unit. This does not provide WOs the information they need to decide if the assignment provides the professional development they require.

64. Current USR policies contained in Army Regulation 220-1, [\*Unit Status Reporting\*](#) unintentionally mask the negative effect on readiness of having junior WOs filling senior WO positions. WOs are reported as one category and not broken down by grade. Therefore, if a unit is required, authorized, and supported by the officer distribution plan, to have three CW4s and two CW2s but has only four CW2s, its USR would list four of five WOs, even though it is really short three senior WOs.

## **Recommendations**

65. When WOs are assigned to duty positions above their rank, provide them the necessary training prior to assignment. This links training to the skills required by grade and position, rather than promotion, and maintains flexibility in WOES.
66. Improve 'Warrant Officer Division's use of a web-based assignments system. The assignment posting should include the duty description, required operational and institutional experiences (qualifications), and a link to the unit.
67. Assign responsibility for professional development and management, assignments, training, and education, of all officers to the branch proponents in the Officer Personnel Management Division (OPMD) of PERSCOM. Determine and allocate resources for branch proponents to accomplish this. Doing this will develop synergy in training, education, leader, and professional development. This integration must be, as a minimum, for assignments and branch-specific schooling. Evaluate the feasibility of maintaining a reduced WO branch to work common schooling, civilian education, Training With Industry and central management of CW5s (similar to the GOMO, colonels branch, and CSM branch).
68. Change AR 220-1, *Unit Status Reporting*, to specify WO shortages by grade rather than combining all WO grades into one category. Doing this will enable commanders to better emphasize the shortage of senior WOs in their units and its impact on unit readiness. The Army must have the ability to measure the effect on readiness caused by shortages of senior WOs.
69. Change AR 614-100, [\*Officer Assignment Policies, Details, and Transfers\*](#), and AR 623-105, *Officer Evaluation Reporting System*, to require general officer approval before a WO can be assigned two grades above or two grades below his or her grade. This recommendation will ensure senior officers in the chain of command are aware of and concur with assigning WOs to positions that do not match their grade in order to meet the needs of the command.
70. In the transformation of WOES, ensure the skills WOs require based on Army assignment beliefs and practices are taught at the appropriate levels.
71. Direct PERSCOM to assign WOs by grade rather than by grade band.

## **COUNSELING**

### **Conclusions**

72. Professional development counseling, as outlined in FM 6-22 (22-100), *Army Leadership*, is not consistently performed across the Army. Among surveyed WOs, at least 53 percent say that they do not receive formal face-to-face counseling that aids in developing leadership skills. A majority of WOs do not believe that raters provide adequate guidance and support for WO development. Further, almost 90 percent of WOs responding to the comprehensive survey report that they had either, "none" or only "one or two" counseling sessions with their rater during the last rating period (see Table 8). Focus group data confirms what WOs indicated in the comprehensive survey, that counseling is not taking place in the field. Some WOs complained that they have to "make" their boss counsel them.
73. When asked if they receive adequate feedback on their professional development, WO focus group responses indicate that soldiers either do not receive feedback on their professional development or they develop their own feedback by assessing themselves against their peers. WOs do not feel their branch officer supervisors understand the technical aspects of WO jobs, and are thus not considered good sources of developmental feedback. As a result, many WOs use self-evaluation to assess their professional development. Those WOs who do receive feedback identify superiors, peers, raters, and instructors as viable sources. A few also mention the OER support form and formal counseling as sources for feedback.

74. The OER System stresses the importance of sound senior/subordinate relationships. It also stresses the importance of setting standards and giving direction and guidance to subordinate officers. Properly used, the OER System can be a powerful leadership and management tool for the rating chain. The key to the system's secondary function (that of a developmental tool) is effective communication. The OER System encourages continual two-way communication between senior and subordinate officer. Senior/subordinate communication also makes career development information, advice, and guidance more available to the rated officer. This enables the rated officer to take advantage of his or her superior's experience when making decisions that affect his or her career.

**Table 8. Comprehensive Survey – Number of Performance Counseling Sessions with Rater**

Component	Cohort	"None"	"One or Two"
Active	WO1	39%	43%
	CW2	43%	45%
	CW3 – CW5	50%	40%
ARNG	WO1	60%	38%
	CW2	62%	32%
	CW3 – CW5	60%	33%
USAR	WO1	56%	33%
	CW2	50%	39%
	CW3 – CW5	50%	41%

75. AR 623-105 *Officer Evaluation Reporting System* states, "Rater conducts mandatory quarterly counseling with the rated officer and makes adjustments to performance objectives on the support form, if required." MILPER MSG 99-113 restates this, however, saying "For LT/WO1, quarterly counseling is mandatory; for CPT/CW2, goal is once around midpoint (3-6 months). Field grade follow-up counseling is on an as needed basis." No mention is made of counseling requirements for CW3, CW4 or CW5, unless one assumes their inclusion under field-grade counseling.

76. Guidance in AR 623-105, particularly as it relates to senior to subordinate advice and counseling, is designed for, and better suited to, branch officers, where the rater is senior in grade and experience to the subordinate (i.e. battalion commander to company commander). In the case of most lieutenants and captains, they are senior in grade, but rarely senior in experience to the CW3s and CW4s that they advise, counsel, and rate. Appendix C, FM 6-22 (22-100) provides a solution to this inverse relationship. The rater uses the nondirective approach to counseling to "maintain focus on individual and organizational goals and objectives."

77. AR 623-105, [\*Officer Evaluation Reporting System\*](#) states—

The primary function of the OERS is to provide information to DA for use in making personnel management decisions. This information is supplied to DA by the rating chain in the officer's assigned/attached organization. The secondary function of the OERS is to encourage officer professional development and enhance mission accomplishment.

78. The Chief, OER Policy, PERSCOM has stated—

It is widely believed that the OER exists solely to provide performance information to selection boards and assignment managers. It does this, but in the long run, of greater import to the Army, is its power in creating and reinforcing behavior. Therefore, after consideration of selection board and field reaction, we must go beyond to its leader development role, which includes inculcation of values and leadership doctrine, counseling transition of the new officers into our culture, linkage of performance to mission and OPMS XXI.

79. Many comments critical of the OER system's effectiveness in evaluating WO performance indicate that the OER is not well suited to evaluation of WOs in technical positions, or that WOs are being rated on extra duties and not their technical competence. Many suggest that raters should receive training specific to rating WOs due to the primarily technical focus of many WO specialties. Some complain about lieutenants rating CW4s and CW5s, highlighting a fairly general concern that junior officers simply are not qualified or knowledgeable enough to counsel and rate mid-level and senior WOs

80. Most RC comments regarding the OER indicate that the system is not being implemented properly, if at all. The respondents are not critical of the OER system but of those in leadership positions responsible for ensuring the system is used as intended. Overall, RC WOs were most likely to indicate that the OER system is not effective. Of the three groups (AC WOs, RC WOs, and branch officers), branch officers were the least critical of the system.

81. As a personnel management tool, the current OER system does not adequately account for low population densities in some WO specialties. A small population does not allow senior raters to develop a profile that allows above center of mass (ACOM) ratings. That situation results some WOs receiving a center of mass (COM) rating when their performance merits an ACOM rating. A large number of comments indicate that forced distribution rules regarding senior rater profiles unfairly penalize WOs in low-density specialties with forced COM ratings. Senior raters of WOs in low-density specialties emphasize ACOM performance in the senior rater comments section, but that cannot compensate for a COM rating. Overall, respondents in the aviation branch (which has the highest WO concentration) are most likely to indicate the system is working adequately. Some report that the system only works if it is managed and implemented properly within the unit.

82. The OER is not being utilized in its secondary function as a developmental tool. Only 35–46 percent of WOs in all components report that their chain of command provides effective developmental support. Soldiers indicate there is no formal system to train or develop WOs in their units. WOs mention that they are expected to bring NCO leader development with them and that a “sink or swim” mentality pervades with respect to their leader development. For units with more than one WO, peers and senior WOs are seen as valuable resources for guidance with their individual self-development of leadership skills.

### **Recommendations**

83. Update AR 623-105 to incorporate MILPER Message 99-113. Develop and include guidance on counseling CW3s, CW4s, and CW5s. This counseling should take place at the start of the rating period, at an interim point, and in a final session when the OER is written.

84. Reemphasize the importance of two-way communication, feedback, and developmental counseling in WO leader development in accordance with AR 623-105, MILPER Message 99-113, and FM 6-22 (22-100) in the Officer Education System: Officer Basic Course, Captains Career Course (CCC), the [Command and General Staff Officer Course](#) (CGSOC) and DA Pre-Command Courses– ([Fort Leavenworth](#)).

85. Require TRADOC to develop a counseling tool using performance indicators listed in Appendix B, FM 6-22 (22-100). Provide OES instruction that links these core competencies to WO leader development. Incorporate this product into the Center for Army Leadership's US Army Developmental Counseling Library (<http://www.counseling.army.mil>).

86. Issue guidance requiring raters junior in experience to use the nondirective approach described in FM 6-22 (22-100) when counseling mid-level and more senior warrant officers.

87. Provide instruction in OBC, CCC, and PCC on guidance for WO OERs contained in AR 623-105, *Officer Evaluation Reporting System*, Appendix B. Hyperlink this information to every branch homepage.

88. PERSCOM must educate the field on DA guidance to promotion boards regarding low-density specialty OERs by publishing pertinent extracts from DA Memo 600-2, *Policies and Procedures for Active-Duty List Officer Selection Boards* and DA instructions to promotion boards on the OER Myths and Facts web page.

## TRAINING AND EDUCATION

### WHAT THE FIELD TOLD US

- Active component WOs report that WOES does not adequately develop the technical skills that they need.
- WOs report that programs of instruction are outdated. Timing is not synchronized with assignment practices.
- WOs want more technical and specialty-specific training
- WOs want better leadership training.
- WOs feel they are not adequately prepared to act as technical experts.
- WOs want more hands-on technical courses using the latest technology.
- WOs want more support at unit level to develop and sustain technical skills.

### THE WARRANT OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM (WOES)

#### Conclusions

89. WOES has never met its requirements as put forth in Army doctrine. It does not adequately prepare WOs for their roles, duties, responsibilities and authority in their operational experiences and competencies. The Army's premise for WO training and leader development is that WOs are accessed with the leadership, tactical, and technical skills they need, and that they maintain the required competencies through operational experiences. In reality, WOs have varying degrees of leadership, tactical, and technical competence based on branch, military occupation specialty, and assignment. WOES does not meet the training and leader development requirements of this diverse population.

90. WOES is not presently, nor has it ever been, based on a needs analysis linked to WO roles, duties, responsibilities, authority, and performance standards. The result is that WOs are not prepared for their responsibilities. The technical competence of some WOs is at risk and may have already been impaired in some specialties. WOES provides neither the technical training in institutional courses nor the functional training that WOs in technical specialties require to stay technically competent and current in the full array of Army systems – legacy, IBCT, and Objective Force. Above all, it fails to ensure that all WOs develop the branch and specialty skills, knowledge, and actions required for full spectrum operations in the contemporary operational environment.

91. The WOES curriculum has not kept up with the revolutionary changes in technology and the Army's use of off-the-shelf technology. This situation prevents WOs from getting training essential to sustaining their technical expertise. The assessment and feedback system between the institution and field does not keep pace with changes in doctrine, organization and materiel. This shortcoming limits WOs' ability to acquire the necessary training through institutional experiences and self-development. These training shortcomings prevent WOs from executing their roles as technical experts, integrators, trainers, and leaders.

92. TRADOC Regulation 351-10, [\*Institutional Training and Education\*](#), specifies providing specialty technical training as the primary purpose of the WO basic and advanced courses. Respondents in the field said the curricula are neither current nor adequate, and that more specialty technical subjects are needed. WO basic and advanced courses do not provide the technical training, direct leader skills and actions training, and education required to adequately prepare WOs for their assignments.

93. Senior WOs require better training and education to ensure they can perform their roles as advisors, system experts, and systems integrators during full spectrum operations in the contemporary operational environment. They are leaders who integrate the functions performed in their specialty with broader Army functions. This skill includes developing effective interface with higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters, government agencies, and civilian contractors. They manage, monitor, and directly supervise commandwide or worldwide programs within the scope of their specialty. The current Warrant Officer Senior Course and Warrant Officer

Senior Staff Course do not prepare WOs to meet these requirements. Much of the WOSC is instruction on research and staff skills, while most of the WOSSC consists of guest speakers addressing various facets of how the Army runs, the roles of WOs, Army use of complex technology, and the changing Army missions in the post-Cold War world.

94. The quality and quantity of technical training varies between branches in the basic and advance courses. WOES does not provide any specialty technical training to CW4s and CW5s after their advance course. Almost 60 percent of technical WOs believe the training they get is out of date. WOs do not believe training and education on how to practice and integrate their technical skills in a combat environment is adequate (see Table 9).

**Table 9. Comprehensive Survey – WOES Provides Adequate Technical Training**

<b>Branch</b>	<b>Percent of AC WOs who Disagree or Strongly Disagree</b>
Military Intelligence	83%
Signal	72%
Ordnance Corps	68%
Aviation	64%
Adjutant General Corps	56%
Field Artillery	53%
Special Forces	44%
Military Police	43%
Quartermaster	40%
All others (AD, EN, JA, MS, TC, VC)	47%
Overall	62%

95. Between the Warrant Officer Basic and Advanced Courses (an eight-year gap), the Army provides WOs little or no technical training and education. This situation results in erosion of WO branch and specialty technical expertise. Over 40 percent of AC technical service CW2s felt that they were not technically proficient upon arriving at their assignment. The majority of Warrant Officer Training Division directors at the TRADOC schools have identified specific CW2 training and education requirements. Despite an identified requirement to provide technical training to CW2s, only one WO specialty has such a course.

96. WOs require the staff skill training provided in WOSC and WOSSC earlier in their careers. Over 50 percent of AC senior WOs report that WOES courses do not come at the right time in their careers. CW2s participate in planning tactical operations and advise commanders, but have not been taught the communication skills, military decision making process, and understanding of Army organizations, operations, and procedures necessary for Army battle staff work. The current staff skills course for CW2s, ST 7000 Action Officer, does not meet WOs' requirements.

97. TWOS established the Warrant Officer Career Center (WOCC) as TRADOC's executive agent for WOES and as the focal point for Army's WO professional and leader development. Unfortunately, WOCC lacks the resources to accomplish its mission. Consequently, the Army has no system for accrediting the curriculum, facilities, faculty and staff, and students in WOES. A lack of quality assurance and accreditation has led to a WOES that for some specialties provides 18 weeks of specialty-specific training in their WOAC, while other specialties have a WOAC consisting of 4 weeks of common core training and no specialty-specific training.

98. WOES does not provide the direct leader skills, knowledge, and actions WOs require. It does not support lifelong learning because WO education is sequential, not continual and progressive.



99. Only 21 percent of AC senior WOs and 32 percent of AC junior WOs believe they receive adequate training and education in direct leader skills and actions in their institutional courses. Though 51 percent of [Officer Candidate School](#) (OCS) and 85 percent of [Warrant Officer Candidate School](#) (WOCS) candidates are NCOs, OCS curriculum has twice as much leadership training as WOCS. Though the mission and objective of both OCS and WOCS are virtually identical, the two separate and different programs contribute to a lack of understanding between WOs and branch officers.

100. The Army's current training doctrine does not adequately address the role of the WO in training management. WOs in branches other than aviation and Special Forces are not involved in the training management process as much as they feel they should be. The Army's leadership doctrine identifies their role as technical trainers but WOs in most branches and specialties are not sufficiently involved in assessing technical training requirements of soldiers and leaders; identifying technical training requirements; and planning, preparing, and executing that technical training. Consequently, unit training, readiness, and soldier and leader competency with Army systems is diminished.

101. There is consensus among leaders in the field that the Army should expand WOs' role in the planning, preparation, execution and assessment of training to exploit the depth and breadth of their technical expertise. WOs can make important contributions to the capability and combat readiness of their units by virtue of their operational experience. WOs can provide specialized individual training to enlisted soldiers, particularly NCOs. In terms of general operational experience, WOs can impart valuable insights to commanders for collective unit training. In both cases, WOs are an underutilized resource for increasing unit capabilities through training.

102. Warrant officers' technical expertise, and therefore their ability to train effectively, deteriorates due to a lack of institutional and unit technical training between WOBC and WOAC. The Army believes WOs are able to fill that gap and sustain their technical competence through operational experiences that build on the technical skills acquired as a NCO. In reality, however, rapid improvements in technology and the increasingly common acquisition of off-the-shelf commercial equipment results in a mixture of legacy and transformation systems on which the WO must be technically competent. These trends, combined with a decline in the availability of technical training associated with new equipment fielding, make it difficult for the WO to acquire and sustain the technical skills to perform in the roles the Army expects of them.

## **Recommendations**

103. Conduct a systematic needs analysis, job analysis, and critical individual task analysis as specified in TRADOC Regulation 350-70, *Systems Approach to Training*, to determine the training and education requirements for WOs by branch, specialty, and grade. Link it to the following:

- The updating of DA Pam 600-3, and elimination of DA Pam 600-11.
- The updating of WO duties by grade and specialty in DA Pam 611-21, Chapter 8, Qualifications for and Duties of Specific Military Occupations,
- The development of individual tasks, conditions, standards, performance measures, and doctrinal references associated with battle-focused duties.

104. Develop and implement an integrated education system for all Army officers that accounts for common direct leader skills and actions required by the Army Vision and full spectrum operations in the contemporary operational environment. This education system must also meet the training and leader development requirements of Army officers by branch, grade, position, specialty, functional area, and assignment. For WOs, it must assure their technical competence throughout their career and begin with a needs analysis, job analysis and critical individual task analysis to determine and implement valid training development and training requirements.

105. The first priority of the WO-specific portion of the OES, must be to attain and sustain WO technical competence. It must provide for specific WO training and education requirements by branch, grade, specialty, position, and assignment. This training and education must balance the leadership and technical skills required

by each branch. Invest in the leadership and technical training required to support the leader development of WOs accessed through the early and early career methods.

106. Link this education system to the established roles, duties, responsibilities, and authority of WOs in the Army's operational, leadership, and training doctrine. In addition, link it to performance standards, what WOs are expected to know and be able to do by grade, branch, specialty, position, and assignment. This integrated education system must develop and implement nested training opportunities, investments in infrastructure and educational technologies, and staff and faculty. Begin by examining the shared training and education requirements and opportunities in OCS, WOCS and the Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC). Develop a combined preappointment/precommissioning candidate training course for all officer and WO candidates. It should produce officers grounded in the fundamentals of officership, bonded as an officer cohort to the Army, capable of small unit leadership, and possessing sound conceptual and interpersonal skills. These officers then attend BOLC Phase I, as appropriate, to receive the training and education needed to be small unit combat leaders and develop sound small unit, tactical decision making skills.

107. Provide Army staff skills training to warrant officers using either the resident course or the advanced distributed learning version of CAS3. The timing for this training would be determined by each branch proponent, as appropriate to the career path of the warrant officer's specialty. CW2s and above participate in planning tactical operations and advise commanders, but are not provided training in communications skills, the military decision making process, and Army organizations, operations, and procedures necessary for professional Army staff work. Provide requirements-based specialty-specific training to CW2s to sustain and update their technical expertise.

108. Provide requirements-based specialty-specific training to CW2s to sustain and update their technical expertise. Deliver training using a hybrid of learning methodologies as determined by each proponent: including, Advanced Distributed Learning, Training with Industry (TWI), Assignment-Oriented Training, civilian schooling, and functional courses.

109. Enable reach back (from the field to the institution) and reach forward (from the institution to the field) assignment-oriented training and education for WOs during their operational experiences throughout their careers. Blend resident, distributed learning, TWI, and specialty-focused post-secondary and vocational civilian education. Involve proponents and commanders in developing requirements and forming education partnerships with post-secondary and vocational schools near installations.

110. Organize the current training and education for CW3 along the lines of a career course. Phase I should provide all CW3s with branch-specific training on doctrine, organization, and materiel, with a focus on technical expertise and leadership. Examine the common branch training requirements in WOAC and CCC. Focus on common branch doctrine, organization, and materiel instruction. This phase should provide hands-on, performance-oriented field and simulation training. Phase II should provide CW3s with specialty-specific technical training.

111. Provide requirements-based technical training to CW4s to sustain and update their branch-related and specialty-specific technical expertise. Develop and sustain this technically focused training using a hybrid of learning methodologies as determined by each proponent: including, advanced distributed learning, TWI, assignment-oriented training, civilian schooling, and functional courses. Examine the possibility of merging the Warrant Officer Staff Course curricula into a warrant officer graduating track of the ILE at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.

112. For CW5s, provide training in strategic Army operations and issues, branch-technical integration, operational-level combined arms doctrine and tactics, joint operations, and cross-branch systems integration.

113. Establish a comprehensive WOES military accreditation process to maintain professional military education standards over time in four areas: faculty, curriculum, facilities, and students.

114. Review leadership training in WOES. Ensure it provides WOs experience-based training and education in the leader attributes and direct leader skills and actions in FM 6-22 (22-100), *Army Leadership*. Use FM 6-22 (22-100), Appendix B, Performance Indicators, and the TRADOC Common Core leadership subjects as the starting point.

115. Require completion of appropriate level WOES courses within one year of being promoted to CW3 and CW4. Doing this will link WO promotions with institutional training and education. Incorporate this requirement into appropriate Army regulations.

116. Include in institutional and unit professional development programs training and education on full spectrum operations, the contemporary operational environment, and the Army Vision, and what they mean to WO roles, duties, responsibilities, and authority. This training should be tailored by branch, specialty, and grade.

117. When WOs are assigned to duty positions above their rank, provide them the necessary training prior to assignment. This links training to the skills required by grade and position, rather than promotion and maintains flexibility in WOES.

118. Take the TRADOC mandated common core out of WOBC and have all WOs receive this common core training during candidate school, Basic Officer Leadership Course and by Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL). Use the POI time that was taken up by common core for specialty specific training. This recommendation will keep WOBC a technically oriented course.

119. Revise FM 7-0 (25-100), *Training the Force*, and FM 7-1 (25-101), *Battle Focused Training*, to emphasize the WO role of technical experts and trainers in the training process.

120. Require proponents to develop exportable, web-based, technical training support packages (reach back and reach forward) to facilitate WO currency with emerging technologies within their specialty. These must be accessible worldwide and toll free (i.e., via TSACS link to AKO).

121. Involve proponents and commanders in developing requirements and forming education partnerships with post secondary and vocation schools near installations.

## **STANDARDS AND ASSESSMENTS**

### **Conclusions**

122. The Army's lack of published performance standards for most WOs' specialties is not a new issue. In 1991, the [Warrant Officer Leader Development Action Plan](#) (WOLDAP) identified most WOs' specialties as not having a document available outlining the critical skills, knowledge and attributes required at each WO grade. WOLDAP asserted that properly developed Warrant Officer Military Qualification System (WOMQS) manuals would greatly assist WOs in understanding individual responsibilities and in acquiring the skills to necessary serve successfully at each level. Such standards would also provide commanders with a road map of realistic expectations for their WOs. WOLDAP recommended developing a WOMQS system and publishing common and branch specific WOMQS manuals for WOs through the grade of CW4 (the highest WO rank at that time). DA PAM 350-58, [Leader Development for America's Army](#), October 1994 states the Chief of Staff of the Army approved a recommendation to develop an MQS-type system for WOs (page 50). In actuality, the Army Chief of Staff disapproved the development of WO MQS as of the 2nd Quarter FY 95 due to planned discontinuation of MQS and implementation of Officer Foundation Standards (OFS). The implementation of OFS has yet to be completed.

123. FM 7-1 (25-101), [Battle Focused Training](#), states, "soldiers train better and faster, and to a higher degree of proficiency, when they know the tasks, conditions, and standards." Absent published Army standards, FM 7-1 (25-101) suggests, "leaders develop standards that are challenging, attainable, and easily evaluated." This does not eliminate the Army's requirement to delineate to WOs what they are expected to know and be able to

do, but rather as allowing commanders flexibility to develop additional standards necessary to train their units based on the unit mission essential task list.

124. Individual performance standards for warrant officers (other than aviation) by grade and/or specialty do not exist. Without a solid foundation of battle-focused individual performance standards for each warrant officer specialty, the Army is not a standards-based organization and cannot train WOs to a standard or assess their performance to a standard. The Army has also failed to provide WOs the necessary tools to self-assess and self-develop.

125. In the absence of Army- and proponent-developed individual performance standards, the field is correctly relying on collective training manuals such as mission training plans, field manuals (tactics, techniques, and procedures), Army regulations, technical manuals, or locally established performance objectives to satisfy the need for individual performance standards for each WO specialty.

126. Viewing warfare as first a science, then an art, clarifies the need for performance standards in today's Army. Tasks, conditions, and standards form the science of warfare and establish a foundation from which soldiers and leaders can grow and learn. Adaptability transforms warfare from a science into an art. Adaptability cannot be taught out of a book, but must be learned through experience gained in scenario-driven events at the combat training centers, Warfighter exercises, and other collective training events. Adaptability, however, cannot be developed in a vacuum. Soldiers and leaders must first be trained and proficient in the individual tasks, conditions, and standards from which they will learn to adapt. The science must come before the art. As the Army grows leaders, it must continue to inculcate them with the understanding that, while the conditions under which a task must be performed can and will change, the foundation of standards for that task remains the same. As FM 7-1 (25-101) states, "...as soldier performance level increases, conditions under which tasks are performed become more demanding while standards remain constant."

### **Recommendations**

127. Require proponents to electronically update WO duties by grade and specialty in [DA Pam 611-21, \*Military Occupational Classification and Structure\*](#), Chapter 8: Qualifications for and Duties of Specific Military Occupations.

128. From the updated duty descriptions in DA Pam 611-21, develop and electronically publish individual tasks, conditions, standards; performance measures; and doctrinal references associated with battle-focused duties.

129. Hyperlink these standards to branch web sites and update as needed.

## **LIFELONG LEARNING**

### **Conclusions**

130. FM 6-22 (22-100), [Army Leadership](#), describes self-development as a process "...to enhance previously acquired skills, knowledge and experience," further stating that the goal of self-development is to increase readiness and potential for increased responsibility. FM 6-22 (22-100) emphasizes that self-development—

- Is continuous.
- Involves the individual, first-line leaders and commanders.
- Focus broadens as individuals learn their strengths and weaknesses, determine their individual needs, and become independent.
- Includes civilian and military education.

131. DA PAM 600-11, *Warrant Officer Professional Development*, states, "Institutional training and education in conjunction with operational assignments will not totally ensure that Army warrant officers attain and sustain the degree of competency needed to perform their warfighting mission." Self-development must bridge the gap

between the knowledge and skills acquired in the institutional training base and the knowledge and skills needed in the contemporary operational environment.

132. Self-development goals for WOs are not well defined in WO professional development references. [DA Memo 600-2](#), states, under criteria for selection, that board members will review the entire record. No single factor should be overriding. Within that framework is, “Civilian education and training. Evaluate the appropriateness and extent of civilian education and training, especially that which has been obtained at the direction of the Army.” Appendix G, Section V (Warrant Officer Personnel Management) goes on to say, “Although education is an important factor in enhancing a warrant officer’s potential value to the Army, comparison of nominees on the basis of either civilian or military education attainments must be tempered by an awareness that educational opportunities vary widely by warrant officer career fields. In general, college credits or degrees should be viewed as indicators of individual initiative. Attainment of a CEL 6 (associate degree or its equivalent) prior to entry into career status and a CEL 5 (baccalaureate degree) prior to selection for promotion to CW4 is the ultimate DA goal for warrant officers.”

133. The value of self-development is universally recognized. Almost one hundred percent of survey respondents agree that self-development is important. In addition, the vast majority of warrant officers surveyed (86%) agree that warrant officers are willing to sacrifice off-duty time for self-development. The majority say they are willing to commit at least three hours per week. About one-third say at least 6-10 hours per week. Time available to participate in self-development is often adversely impacted by unit operational pace. WOs’ leadership and technical abilities are not being developed adequately in WOES or operational assignments. Consequently, WOs are not receiving the training necessary to remain current in their technical fields. This situation places greater weight on self-development to bridge the gap between WO institutional and unit training experiences.

134. There are a number of comments concerning a lack of resources for unit training. The respondents express a need for more money and manpower so they can have the time and funding needed to attend training courses. Generally, there is a call for more money to fund advanced technical training, such as sending WOs to civilian industry courses. The feeling is that, if it is left up to the unit, resources will not be provided for WO training. All too often, WOs are not able to break away from their units to receive the training they need, when they need it. The majority (64–74%) of WOs also assert that lack of available on-duty time interferes with their self-development.

135. Unit Training Study Group research indicates that some WO career development models are better than others. One branch includes courses such as the Joint Firepower Control Course (ASI 5U) in its model, but several other branches leave it to the individual to discover this valuable warfighting course. PERSCOM has a link that lists applicable SQI/ASI, but ASI 5U is not listed. Reference to ASI 5U can only be found in DA PAM 351-4 and buried in the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS). Even the branch that lists JFCC in its model does not list the ASI on the PERSCOM warrant specialty structure chart for that specialty. These web sites must become more relevant to the current and future needs of the WOs they serve.

136. A majority of those responding in the comprehensive survey said WOs are familiar with and are interested in using the [Army Distributed Learning Program](#) (ADL). Less than half of WOs surveyed believe they have adequate opportunities for continuing education, and about 40 percent do not believe they have adequate access to ADL equipment.

## **Recommendations**

137. Require proponents to update and maintain WO career development models depicting specific, specialty-related developmental courses/certifications/licensing applicable at appropriate stages (i.e., new assignment, new equipment, or new processes) of a WO’s career.

138. Hyperlink updated, specific, specialty-related, WO developmental courses/certifications/licensing (technical, tactical, and leadership) on each branch's home page. (These are currently buried on the PERSCOM home page and not current).

139. Require commanders to establish and monitor self-development programs for their organizations IAW FM 6-22 (22-100) and FM 7-1 (25-101).

140. Require raters and senior raters to assist WOs in establishing self-development goals (using subordinates' DA Form 67-9-1) and fence time, as the unit mission permits, specifically for self-development activities.

141. Require TRADOC to develop web-based, professional and technical ADL programs (reach-back and reach-forward) that can be accessed worldwide and toll free (i.e. via TSACS) by anyone registered with AKO.

142. Enable continual WO technical training and education through e-learning by expanding [eArmyU.com](http://eArmyU.com) online degree offerings to include programs applicable to WOs. In coordination with branch proponents, identify universities and colleges that offer e-learning applicable to WO specialties and fund tuition. These courses could be made available to soldiers of enlisted feeder MOSs, increasing their competency, saving resident instruction, and increasing their technical competency when becoming a WO. Link the learning to proponents' requirements for an associate's degree for WO1 through CW3 and bachelor's degree for a CW4 through CW5. Tie acceptable degrees to the WO's specialty. This demonstrates the Army is a learning organization and is committed to investing in technical training and education.

## **STRUCTURE**

### **Conclusions**

143. The current AC WO structure is not providing the proper number of WOs at the proper grades. When WO authorizations and population are compared by grade the AC has a surplus at the grade of CW3, while all other grades have a shortage. In contrast, when WO populations are compared to the average grade distribution matrix (AGDM), WO1/CW2 grades are short 218, the CW3 grade is short 48, while grades CW4 and CW5 have a surplus of 587 and 89 respectively.

144. Our research indicates that a majority of AC WO specialties have a significant disparity between the number of WOs required by specialty and grade versus the number of WOs on hand. Forty-one WO specialties do not have enough CW4s to fill required positions. Twelve WO specialties also have a shortage of CW3s. Further analysis of the current AC WO structure indicates that in 22 WO specialties, junior WOs are forced to fill some of the senior WO positions. In another 22 WO specialties, there are too many CW3s and CW4s for the required positions. Thus, in those 22 specialties senior WOs are filling junior WO positions.

145. This serious misalignment between requirements and the number of AC WOs causes significant difficulties in properly developing WOs through a series of progressively more demanding and senior positions. In some WO specialties it is not unusual for a CW2 to fill a CW4 position, while in other specialties a CW4 may be filling a CW2 position.

146. The structure mismatch between position requirements and the number of available AC WOs has many causes. These were identified in the ADS-XXI Task Force's Warrant Officer Personnel Management System XXI Report (31 August 2001). Two important reasons for the mismatch in structure and inventory are grade creep in authorization documents and accessing soldiers late in their careers. Grade creep in TDA and TOE authorization documents for WO positions has resulted in some specialties having more CW4 positions than CW3 positions. Some have such a high number of CW4 positions that, because of attrition and promotion rates, there will never be enough CW3s to fill them. Additionally, a soldier who is accessed late in his or her military career usually does not have enough time to become a CW4. The majority of WOs retire as CW3s.

### **Recommendations**

147. Complete the ADS XXI grade-rollback initiative to realign the authorized grades for WOs throughout the AC TDA and TOE units to better reflect the actual WO grades required. Specifically, allow each branch proponent to adjust the Army's AGDM for WOs to fit their needs and requirements. At the very least, consider creating an ADGM for aviation warrant officers, and a separate one for technical service warrant officers. Once this ADS-XXI initiative is complete, the number of WOs filling a position that does not match their grade will significantly decrease. This situation will improve the ability of assignment managers to assign WOs to appropriate positions.

### **SUMMARY**

148. The Army has relied upon warrant officers as its technically expert officer cohort for many years. The Objective Force, with its projected reliance upon modern systems and technology, will likely bring an expanded role for warrant officers. That said, the Army must make fundamental changes in the warrant officer (WO) cohort to support full spectrum operations. At the heart of this change is a complete integration of WOs into the larger officer corps – a process begun in the late 1980s and never completed. Warrant officers are recruited, accessed, paid, managed, educated, and retained separately from commissioned officers. The Army needs to clarify the roles of WOs, then make changes to WO professional development, training and education, and manning. These changes must be relevant to the roles of WOs and must be connected to each other by WOs' need for lifelong learning, structure, and standards and assessment. The Army must adopt these 63 recommendations as a whole, not individually. Only by fully integrating WOs into the larger officer corps can the Army expect to receive the synergistic benefits of this panel's recommendations.